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Trade  Policy
The unconditional extension of the fruits of trade  preferendal trading arrangements, promoted
negotiations under the General Agreenment  on  forms of conditional MFN, and sought discrimi-
Tariffs and Trade is giving way to bilateral and  natory treatment for some of its exports and
other discriminatory trade agreements. Led by  imports. No nondiscriminatory leadership has
the United States, GATT has taken a strong  emerged to replace that of the United States.
position against discrimination:  the benefits of
negotiations under GATT generally have been  The threat to multilateralism and small
extended to all contracting parties without  traders will be reduced if:
specific conditions or reservations. This uncon-
ditional extension of benefits - the uncondi-  *  New trade-liberalizing "clubs" that are
tional most-favored-nation principle (MFN)-  formed in the Uruguay Round, or elsewhere, are
is now under considerable pressure.  open to new members on the same terms that
apply to te -founders.
Supporters of conditional MFN point out
that it ensures reciprocity ard, by discouraging  *  Compliance with the rules of such clubs is
foot-dragging and free-riding, encourages nego-  determined multilaterally and not unilaterally by
tiation.  On the other hand, advocates of uncon-  any existing members.
ditional MFN argue that it ensures that the
btiefits  of negotiations are not wasted, that it  *  Markets that are levered open are opened in
simplifies administration of trade barriers,  a nondiscriminatory manner.
reduces friction between nations, protects the
small and weak, and facilitates the development  *  Preferential trading arrangements conform
and preservation of a multilateral trading system.  to the relevant GATT rule - Article XXIV.
Although the United States has pursued  *  The main safeguard provision of GA1T
nondiscriminatory trade pacts since 1923,  (Article XIX) remains nondiscriminatory.
Washington has in a recent tumaround pursued
This paper is a product of the Research Administrator's Office. Copies are available
free from the World Bank, 1818  H Street NW, Washington DC 20433. Please contact
Jane Sweeney, room S13-131. extension 31021.
The PPR Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work under way in the Bank's Policy, Planning, aid Research
Complex. An objective of the series is to get these findings out quickly, even if presentations are less than fully polished.
The fmdings, interpretations, and conclusions in these papers do not necessarily represent official policy of the Bank.




I.  Foot-shooting  and Slammed  Doors  ........  1
II.  Opening Doors  ..........................  4
Reciprocity  ............................  4
Forms of Discrimination  ................  6
Conditional and  Unconditional MFN  ......  7
Agriculture  ............................  11
Clothing and Textiles  ..................  12
Other Voluntary Export Restraints  ......  13
Contingent  Protection  ..................  13
Preferential  Arrangements  ..............  14
III.  Towards Ubiquitous  Discrimination?  .....  14
GATT Codes  .............................  16
Article XIX  ............................  18
IV.  Conclusion  .............................  18
This paper was prepared for the Commonwealth Seminar on Protectionism and the
Uruguay Round Negotiations convened by  the Commonwealth Secretariat and the
Trade Policy Research Center, Lancaster  House, London, July 18-20, 1988.
[11I.  Foot-shooting  and  Slammed  Doors
Just  as trade  has  two  sides  to it,  so  does  the  inability  to trade.
Mutually  beneficial  trading  may  fail  to occur  because  opportunities  are  missed
by the  seller,  or by the  buyer. Thus  it is  with  nations  as for  individuals.
For  all  the  damage  done  to nations  by the  closure  of  markets  abroad,  much  more
is  probably  self  inflicted  by inappropriate  trading  policies  at home.
Nevertheless  damage  is  done  by  the  closure  of markets  abroad,  even  to those
countries  nimble  enough  to find  their  way through  or  around  many  barriers.
Nowhere  perhaps  is this  more  true  than  for  agricultural  countries  where
although  alternative  crops  and  other  opportunities  may  exist,  the  gains  from
specialization  according  to climatic  or other  advantage  are  particularly
great.
It is  difficult  to believe  that  the  exports  of Japan,  the  Republic  of
Korea,  Singapore,  Hong  Kong  and  Taiwan  have  been  seriously  restrained  by
import  barriers,  and  their  ability  to  avoid  them  has  been  remarkable.  In part
they  have  been  helped  by the  form  of  many  of the  barriers,  in that  negotiated2
export  restraints  have  enabled  them  to raise  their  export  prices,  unlike  the
most  common  forids  of barriers  to  agricultural  trade,  for  example,  and  have
discouraged  new  entrants. Restraints  have  been  accepted  by exporters  as an
alternative  to harsher  forms  of trade  restriction.  Some  countrtes  even  appear
to  have  been  able  to increase  their  export  earnings  as a consequence  of the
restraints,  at least  in  the  short  run (Tarr,  1987),  but  there  is little  doubt
that  these  restrictions  have  been  costly  to  exporters  as a  whole,  and
particularly  to  developing  country  exporters,  even  when  ways to  circumvent
them  have  been  discovered.
Has  world  trade  become  more or less  liberal  over  th.  thirty  or
forty  years? Over  most  of that  period,  international  trade  hes  grown  mucn
faster  than  world  production:  between  1950  and  1975  the  merchandise  trade
(excluding  o:l)  of industrial  countries  grew  almost  twice  as fast  as their
gross  domestic  product  (Bergsten  and  Cline,  1983,  p.59). This in  itself  could
suggest  that  the  predominant  thrust  of trade  policy  has  been  liberal,  or at
least  that  policies  have  not  blocked  tendencies  toward  international
specialization.  Recent  history  is  more  or less  in  line  with these  broad
trends,  though  both  output  and  trade  have  grown  slower  over  the  last  dozen  or
so years.  From 1980  to 1986  growth  of world  manufacturing  output  averaged  2
1/2%  per  annum,  wit:i  manufacturing  exports  at  4 1/2%,  though  agricultural
exports  at 1%  per  annum  grew  at less  than  half  the  rate  of agricultural
output.  (GATT,  1987,  Table  1.1)
Turning  to the  measurement  of trade  barriers,  it is  very  difficult  to
determine  whether  chese  have  been  increasing  or decreasing.  Certainly  tariffs3
on imports  of  manufactured  products  imposed  by the  major  industrial  countries
have  decreased  over  the  postwar  period. When  the  tariff  reductions  agreed  in
the  Tokyo  Round  of multilateral  trade  negotiations  are  fully  implemented,  the
average  of these  tariffs  will be  well  under  10%  in both  nominal  and  effective
terms. But  such  a calculation  ignores  tariffs  and  non tariff  barriers  (NTBs)
on i  -icultural  products  (reflected  in  the  slow  growth  of agricultural  trade
relative  to output),  other  non  tariff  barriers,  and  export-promoting
subsidies,  as  well  as all  the  trade  barriers  of developing  and  centrally-
planned  countries. A careful  study  supports  the  general  perception  that  non-
tariff  barriers  are  proliferating  (Nogues,  Olechowski  and  Winters,  1986).
Concentrating  on sixteen  industrial  countries,  the  authors  conclude  that  at
least  27%  of the  countries'  imports,  "some  $230  billion  of 1981  imports,
would  have  been  covered  by one  or  more  of the  selected  NTBs  as they  applied  in
1983"  (p.  197). They identified  about  2,500  (net)  additional  NTBs  imposed
between  1981  and  1983,  these  being  quite  separate  from  the  tightening  and
reinforcement  of pre-existing  barriers.
So while  tariffs  have  been  falling  in  much  of the  world,  other  trade
barriers  have  been  rising. And  the  change  has  been  associated  with  changes  in
the  trading  system. Gradually  there  has  been  a swing  from  a system  based  on
general  trading  rules,  applicable  to  most  products  and  countries,  to  one  based
on product-  and  ciuntry-specific  trade  management,  a change  from  non-
discrimination  to  discrimination.  This  trade  management  and  discrimination
has  arisen  from  three  sources:  in responding  to  new  and  highly  competitive
sources  of supply;  in  the  development  of  preferential  trading  relations;  and
in  attempts  to lever  open  markets  that  have  been  closed  or regulated  by4
government  decree. There  are  both  trade  expanding  and  contracting  forces  at
work  here,  as well  as trade  diverting. Of particuzar  concern  is  that  when  all
traders  are  not  treated  equally,  it is the  small  and  the  new  entrants  that  are
likely  to  be prejudiced.
II.  Opening  Doors
In seeking  to  open  the  trading  doors,  a  key  question  is  whether  this
is  now  best  done  on a bilateral  basis,  plurilaterally  (where  this  implies
among  a restricted  number  of countries),  or fully  multilaterally.  There  are
really  two  steps  in this  question:  (i)  what is  the  best  grouping  among  which
to conduct  negotiations,  and  (ii)  whether,  and  on  what  terms,  to offer  the
results  of the  negotiations  to  other  parties.
Reciprocity
Reciprocity  is  at the  core  of trade  negotiations.  As reciprocity  is
extremely  difficult  to  handle  in  a many  country,  many product  framework,  it
tends  to lead  to country-by-country  or product-by-product  negotiations,
whether  or not  the  fruits  of the  negotiations  are  taen  extended  more  widely.
A major  accomplishment  of the  General  Agreement  on Tariffs  and  Trade  has  been
to provide  a framework  for  reciprocity  to  be  negotiated  across  a very  wide
group  of commodities  and  countries.  General  trading  rules  are  specified  in
the  GATT  (for  example  the  proscription  of trade  barriers  other  than  import
tariffs  and  of preferential  trading  arrangements,  except  in specified5
circumstances)  and  while  bargaining  on tariffs  for  particular  groups  of
products  has  often  been  between  the  principal  suppliers  of them,  the  fruits  of
these  bargains  have then  been  extended  to  all  other  members  of the  GATT
without  any specific  conditior.  Trading  rules  of general  %pplication  and the
unconditional  extension  of benetLts  --  the  unconditional  aost-favoured-nation
(MFN)  principle  that  is  embodied  in  Article  I  of the  GATT  --  are  the  essence
of the  GATT system,  but  they  are  now  under  considerable  pressure. Have
general  trading  rules  and  the  unconditional  MFN  approach  reached  the  end  of
their  useful  life? Will a  more  restrictive  development  of rules  and  extension
of negotiated  benefits  now  be  more  productive  in  reducing  and  restraining
trade  barriers? And  what  happens  to  all  the  existing  multilateral  and  non-
discriminatory  trade  agreements  if the  emphasis  is  now  to be  on bilateral  or
"minilateral"  reciprocity?  What  happens  to those  who  have little  with  which
to bargain?
Of course,  governments  enter  trade  negotiations  not  only  in  order  to
reduce  the  trading  barriers  of  other  countries.  The process  of negotiation
and  the  outcome  can  be of considerable  domestic  benefit. The  process  of
negotiations  can  enable  governments  to  look  at the  general  interest  of their
own  country  rather  than  simply  respond  to the  pressures  of sectional
interests. This  is  an aspect  of what  is  often  referred  to as the  bicycle
theory  of trade  negotiations.  The  negotiations  themselve.i  provide  a general-
interest  momentum  to  resist  sectional  pressures,  and the  commitments  entered
into  can  be a  useful  bulwark  in  resisting  these  pressures  when  the
negotiations  are  over.  So in  considering  the  appropriate  forum  and  country
groupings  for  conducting  negotiations  and  for  entering  into  commitments,  one6
needs  to  bear in  mind domestic  as  well  as foreign  implications.  But  it is  the
international  dimension  that  is  the  focus  of  attention  here.
Forms  of  Discrimination
If  nothing  is being  abtained  in return,  it  will  almost  invariably  be
in  a country's  economic  interest  to  be non-discriminatory  in its  trade;
favouring  one supplier  over  others  will  mean  that  the  country  is  paying  more
than  it  need  for  at least  some  of its  imports,  if  not  all. Thus  preferential
access  will  only  be  warranted  if something  is  obtained  in  return,  and  the
gains  need to  be  weighed  against  the  costs. Diverting  the  sourcing  of imports
to  more  expensive  suppliers  is  the  most  obvious  cost.  But  not  all  the  costs
may  be immediately  apparent:  some  may  be  of a systemic  nature  that  take  time
to  unfold. Any  discrimination  in favour  of a country  is  discrimination
against  others,  and  each  act  of  discrimination  encourages  a discriminatory
system  that  will  discriminate  against  as  well  as for  any  particular  country.
The  net  effect  could  be the  closing,  not  opening,  of  markets  for  a country's
exporters.
The  unilateral  granting  of trading  preferences  from  developed  to
developing  countries  under  the  Lome  and  GSP  arrangements  are  the  leading
examples  of discriminatory  quids  apparently  being  granted  without  reciprocal
quos. While  there  is little  doubt  that  these  preferences  have  been  of some
benefit  to  the  recipients,  their  effects  have  been  somewhat  disappointing.
Often  they  have  been  severely  circumscribed  in  their  coverage. (Laird  and
Sapir,  1987). But  apart  from  this,  there  is  little  doubt  that  this  unilateral7
and preferential  granting  of access  has pretty  well  run  its  course. Countries
may  of course  take  the  view  that  the  lifting  of trLde  barriers  is  in their  own
best  interests. But  to the  extent  that  barrier  reduction  requires  negotiation
or that  negotiations  are  required  to prevent  barriers  from  being  raised,  the
question  of the  appropriate  structure  oi negotiations  remains,  as  does the
question  of with  whom  the  fruits  of these  negotiations  should  be shared.
Discrimination  can  take  many forms:  broad  bilateral  and  plurilateral
preferential  agreements,  with  varying  degress  of  openness  to  new  members,
industry  specific  arrangements  that  allocate  access  quantitatively,  and  the
granting  of most-favoured-nation  (MFN)  treatment  conditionally.  Industry  or
sector  specific  negotiations  almost  invariably  discriminate  against  the
cheapest,  more efficient  sources. This  has  led  many  to  argue  that  non-
discrimination  is the  sine  qua  non  of real  trade  liberplization  (e.g.  Tumlir,
1985);  others  argue  that  discrimination  is  often  the  lesser  of two  evils,
being  the  only  way in  which  some  markets  can  be  opened  at all.
Conditional  and  Unconditional  MFN
The  debate  between  conditional  and  unconditional  MFN is  an old  one
and  one  which  underlies  a great  deal  of current  disputation  regarding
discrimination.  Under  conditional  MFN the  concessions  gi-en  by Austria  to
Burma,  for  example,  in  response  to  concessions  given  by Burma  to  Austria,
would  be extended  to  China,  say,  only  if  China  granted  to  Austria  concessions
that  are  judged  to  be equivalent  to those  given  by  Burma. Under  unconditional
MFN  on the  other  hand  the  concessicns  negotiated  between  Austria  and  Burma8
would  be extended  unconditionally  to all  other  countries.  The  GATT  provides
for  unconditional  MFN  among  all  members  of the  GATT. Non-members  may  receive
the  benefits  also,  but  they  have  no assurance  of receiving  them,  nor  that,
having  received  them,  they  will  not  be  removed.
It is  often  argued  that  conditional  MFN  ensures  reciprocity,
encourages  negotiation,  and that  negotiation  coin  is  not  wasted. The
argu-:nt  is that  unconditional  MFN tends  to inhibit  trade  negotiat  by
encot.raging  foot  dragging  and  free  riding  --  countries  will  hang  back  from
negotiations  hoping  to  get  the  benefits  from  the  reductions  in  barriers
negotiated  by others. Again,  it is  often  argued  that  unconditional  MFN is  not
fair:  it  may  be regarded  as  unfair  to  Austria  for  China  to get  "free"  from
Burma  the  concessions  that  Austria  bought,  by  means  of its  own  concessions,
from  Burma. And if the  United  States  has incurred  considerable  economic  an'd
political  costs  in levering  open  the  Japanese  beef  or the  Korean  insurance
market  should  it  not insist  that  it  alone  receives  the  benefits  of this
increased  access? It car.  also  be argued  that  unconditional  MFN  will  distort
trade  in  that,  in  an attempt  to  restrict  free  riding,  tariff  categories  will
be  constructed  so  as limit  the  benefits  to  the  finely  specified  commodities
produced  by the  countries  that  are  negotiating  with  each  other.
Against  these  points  it  c..  be argued  that  unconditional  MFN  ensures
that  the  benefits  of  negotiations  are  not  eroded. A subsequent  conditional
MFN  bargain  between  Burma  and  China  in the  above  example,  could  easily  cancel
the  benefits  that  Austria  had  "bought"  from  Burma  --  Austria  would  then  have
paid  a price  for  nothing. A system  of  unconditional  MFN  ensures  that  each9
participant  knows  where  it  stands  and  that  any  subsequent  deal  will  not  erode
the  negotiated  benefits;  indeed  if  Burma  subsequently  negotiates  mutual
concessions  with  China,  not  only  will  Austria  have  the  benefits  of its
concessions  from  Burma  preserved,  but  it  will  get  benefit  from  any  concessions
that  Burma  and  China  exchange. Furthermore,  it is  argued,  a world  of
conditional  KFN  arrangements  witl  be one  in  which  it  is  very  costly  to
administer  trade  controls,  with  each  country  having  country-specific  tariff
schedules,  and  with the  attendant  rules  of origin  and  determination  of
origin. Disputes  about  what  is  or is  not  an equivalent  concession  will  be
endemic  and  often  bitter. The free  riding  point  may  have  more substance,  and
the  product  specification  twist  can  be  used  to  discourage  it.
A further  and  major  argument  for  non-discrimination  arises  in  the
protection  of small  trading  countries. Enforcement  of international
agreements  is  always  particularly  difficult;  transgression  of rules  or
exception  from  them  is  more  unlikely  when  the  transgression  must  be  against,
or the  exception  given  to,  all  parties  to the  agreement,  and  not  just  one.
This  is  one  of the  most  important  protections  of the  small  trading  nations  in
the  GATT,  as is  evidenced  by repeated  efforts  to circumvent  it  and  to  mcdify
its  application  where  it  is  of particular  importance:  in  particular  in
relation  to  Article  XIX,  the  main safeguard  provision  of the  GATT.
Uncondi;ional  MFN  was the  general  European  practice  during  the
nineteerth  century  and  until  the  early  1930s;  from  1776  until  i923  the  United
States  adopted  conditional  MFN.  At least  one  distinguished  scholar  had  no
doubt  about  which  was superior:10
The  most-favored-nation  clause  :n  American  commercial
treaties,  as conditionally  interpreted  and  applied  by
the  United  States,  has  probably  been  the  cause  in the
last  century  of more  diplomatic  controversy,  more
variations  in construction,  more international  ill-
feeling,  more  conflict  between  international
obligations  and  municipal  law  and  between  judicial
interpretation  and  executive  practice,  more  confusion
a"d  uncertainty  of operation,  than  have  developed
under  all  the  uncondiLional  mCst-favored-nation
pledges  of all  other  countries  combined.  (Viner,  1924)
Nevertheless,  it is  a fact  of life  that  if  countries  with  high
barriers  continue  to draw  benefits  from  greater  access  to  other  markets
without  lowering  the  barriers  to their  own,  they  will  will  strain  the
continued  application  of unconditional  MFN,  inviting  conditional  MFN  and
discrimination  against  themselves.
What  then  is the  more  effective  system  to reduce  trade  barriers? A
non-discriminatory  trade  policy  does  not  of itself  ensure  liberal  trade  though
it  can  be  argued  that  it is  necessary  for  an  enduring  liberal  trading
regime. Indeed  the  experience  of the  United  States  in  the  decade  after  it
adopted  unconditional  MFN in 1923  was so  bad  in  this  regard  (with  the  Smoot-
Hawley  tariff  in particular)  that  it  led  one  of its  main  proponents  (the
economist  F.W.  Taussig)  to rue  its  introduction  (Diebold,  1988,  pp.5-6).
Ironically  he took  this  rather  depressed  view  on the  eve  of a greater
flowering  cf  his  earlier  vision  than  he  might  have  imagined:  a series  of
bilaterally  negotiated  but  non-discriminating  tariff  reductions  by the  United
States  and  with  it the  inauguration  of half  a century  of  unconditional  MFN,
and  unprecedented,  tariff  reducti2ns  by that  country. These  agreements  marked
the  commencement  of U.S.  leadership  in  the  development11
of  a non-discriminatory  world  trading  system,  a leadership  that  in  some  ways
it  now  appears  to be abandoning.
The  GATT  system  of unconditional  MFN  among  the  contracting  parties
to  GATT  has  been  particularly  effective  in  obtaining  and  preserving  reduced
barriers  to imports  of  most industrial  products  by the  developed  countries.
Nearly  all  countries  have  obtained  increased  access  to these  markets  because
of the  required  extension  of the  benefits  of these  reduced  barriers  to all
GATT  members  and  the  de facto  extension  to  most  other  countries.  But  many
argue  that  the  relatively  easy  barriers  have  now  been  reduced. This  success
has  been  bought  by the  extraction  of sensitive  products  from  the  coverage  of
GATT,  by evasion  of GATT,  and  by soft  interpretation  of  GATT's  non-
discrimination  provisions. It is  argued  by some  that  the  more  difficult
problems  can  only  be dealt  with  by  departing  from  general  rules  and  non-
discrimination,  at least  on a transitional  basis. Before  returning  to  this
question  some  of these  compromises  of the  basic  principles  of  GATT  are  briefly
considered.
Agriculture
Agriculture  was  a problem  right  from  the  start  of  GATT.  Special
provisions  were  written  into  the  original  General  Agreement  on  Agriculture  to
cope  with  problems  associated  with  U.S.  farm  support;  these  were  then
explicitly  ignored  by the  U.S.  Congress,  and  a  waiver  was  granted  by the
contracting  parties  to legitimize  what  the  U.S.  was  doing. Other  countries
applied  for  and  received  waivers  from  their  GATT  obligations  with  respect  to12
agriculture,  and  thus  most  of  agriculture  was  effectively  removed  feom  GATT
coverage.
Clothing  and  Textiles
Clothing  and  textiles  emerged  as a developing  country  "problem"  as
Japan  and  then  other  countries  started  on the  path  of industrialization.  They
were  just  too  competitive.  Starting  with  a short-term  cotton  textiles
arrangement  in 1961,  "progress"  was  made to  a long-term  arrangement  in 1962
and  then  to  the  first  Multifibre  Arrangement  (MFA)  in  1973,  extending  the
coverage  to  man-made  fibre  and  wool  products,  as  well  as cotton,  and
subsequently  to  MFA II,  III  and  now  IV.  Despite  all  the  clever  ways in  which
many  producers  have  found  means  to  dodge  around  the  restrictions,  and  the
existence  of many  unfilled  quotas,  the  essence  of these  arrangements  is the
restraint  of exports  by the  developing  countries  to the  developed. The
relevant  products  are  effectively  removed  from  coverage  by the  general
provisions  of the  GATT  as they  apply  to  other  products. The  trade  between  the
parties  to the  MFAs is  thereby  managed  in  an inherently  discriminatory
manner. Is trade  more  liberal  with this  discrimination  than  without  it?  The
counter-factual  cannot  be  known,  but for  what  was  intended  to be  a transient
restrictive  and discriminatory  arrangement  to  facilitate  the  commencement  of
the  Kennedy  Round,  the  arrangements  have  been  remarkably  durable  and  luxurient
(cancerous?)  in their  growth.13
Other  Voluntary  Export  Restraints
The  pattern  set  by clothing  and  textiles  has  been  followed  by  other
commodities,  many  of them  of particular  interest  to  developing  countries,
though  as yet  the  other  voluntary  export  restraints  and  organized  marketing
arrangements  have  not  been  graced  with  the  blessing  of an "Arrangement"
endorsed  by the  Contracting  Parties  to  CATT. Motor  vehicles,  electronic
products,  footwear,  steel,  are  among  those  that  have  been  so  controlled,  often
by government  or industry  arrangements  that  are  not  open  to  outside
scrutiny. Again,  these  industry-specific  arrangements  are  inherently
discriminatory  between  countries  and,  with  the  exception  of footwear,  show
little  sign  of  abating.
Contingent  Protection
Use  of the  antidumping  and  countervailing  duty  provisions  of the  GATT
have  developed  well  beyond  wihat  was  apparently  envisaged  by the  architects  of
CATT,  and  have  become  an additional  arm  of  protection.  The  Codes  negotiated
in  the  Tokyo  Round  of  multilateral  trade  negotiations  appear  to  have
exacerbated  the  use  of these  procedures  to  harass  exporters.  While  the
intention  is  to discriminate  against  "unfair"  trading  practices,  there  is  much
evidence  to suggest  that  the  procedures  are  used  frequently  to  discriminate
against  cheap  imports  whatever  the  cause  of the  cheapness. "New"  sources  are
major  targets. Until  now,  the  non-discriminatory  feature  of the  "fair-trade"
safeguard  provisions  of Article  XIX  has  been  preserved,  but  the  wolves  are  at
the  door.14
Preferential  Arrangements
(i)  Customs  Unions  and  Free  Trade  Areas. The  provisions  of  Article
XXIV  for  the  formation  of customs  unions  and  free  trade  areas  are  among  the
most  abused  of the  CATT:  very  few  if  any  actual  free  trade  agreements  and
customs  unions  appear  to  meet the  strict  provisions  of this  article,  while  the
"Enabling  Clause,"  passed  as part  of the  Tokyo  Round  agreements,  permits
developing  countries  to  grant  each  other  preferences  with  little  or no
inhibition.
(ii)  Other  Preferences.  Preferences  for  developing  countries  are  the
main  other  way in  which  the  strong  position  of the  original  GATT  against
preferential  arrangements,  other  than  customs  unions  and  free  trade  areas,
has  been  breached. Again  the  Enabling  Clause  has  cleared  the  way  for  further
such  preferences,  should  the  will  be there  to  grant  them,  in regard  to  non-
tariff  as  well  as tariff  barriers.
III.  Towards  Ubiquitous  Discrimination?
During  negotiations  for  the  formation  of the  GATT  the  United  States
expressed  unreserved  antipathy  towards  trade  preferences  which  fell  short  of
thorough-going  customs  unions  and  free  trade  areas. Apart  from  its
encouragement  of European  integration  and its  lack  of insistence  that  trade
agreements  arising  from  that  complied  fully  with  GATT's  Article  XXIV,  this
opposition  continued  for  three  decades,  with  the  United  States  holding  out for15
a long  time  apainst  generalized  preferences  for  developing  countries.  More
recently  it  has  departed  from  this  position,  both  in its  pursuit  of
preferential  trading  arrangements  for  itself  and  in its  espousal  of
conditional  MFN in  tackling  new  and/or  difficult  trade  liberalization
problems. Forty  years  ago,  the  United  States  was  concerned  to limit
discrimination  against  its  exports. This  position  has  now  given  way to  the
seeking  of discriminatory  favourable  treatment,  pressure  for  restraints  on
certain  exports  to the  Uni.ed  States,  and  actual  and  threatened  discriminatory
actions  against  foreigners  who  are  perceived  to be  adopting  "unfair  trade"
practices  with  respect  to  exports  to  or from  the  United  States. Much  of the
recent  pressure  for  trade  discrimination  is  a political  response  to the
country's  trade  deficit,  though  the  trend  predates  the  deficit. It is  not
that  the  United  States  is  behaving  differently  from  many  other  countries. But
with  the  shift  in  the  American  position,  the  nature  of the  leadership  being
given  in the  world  economy  has  also  changed:  no  non-discriminatory  leadership
appears  to  have  emerged  to replace  that  of the  United  States.
The  change  of  direction  of the  United  States  is  reflected  in  words  as
well  as deeds. The  Administration's  statement  on trade  policy  on 23
September,  1985  included:
While  our  highest  priority  remains  the  improvement  of
the  world  trading  system  through  a new  round  of
multilateral  trade  negotiations,  the  United  States  is
interested  in  the  possibility  of  achieving  further
liberalization  of trade  and investment  through  the
negotiation  of bilateral  free-trade  arrangements  such  as
the  one  recently  concluded  with  Israel. We believe
that,  at times,  such  agreements  could  complement  our
multilateral  efforts  and facilitate  a  higher  degree  of16
liberalization,  mutually  beneficial  to  both  parties,
than  would  be possible  within  the  multilateral  context."
More  recently,  the  Secretary  of  Treasury  said:
(Our]  approach  is idealistic  in  aim,  but  realistic  and
often  incremental  in  method. It  seeks  to  move  nations
toward  a  more  open  trading  system  through  a strategy  of
consistent,  complementary,  and  reinforcing  actions  on
various  international  fronts,  bilateral  and
multilateral.  ... (The  Trade  Agreement  with  Canada]  is
.* a lever  to  achieve  more  open  trade. Other  nations
are  forced  to  recognize  that  we  will  devise  ways  to
expand  trade  --  with  or  without  them.  If  they  choose
not  to  open  their  markets,  they  will  not  reap  the
benefits.  ...  While  we normally  associate  a liberal
trading  system  with  multilateralism  --  bilateral  or
minilateral  regimes  may  also  help  move  the  world  toward
a more  open  system."  (Remarks  by the  Secretary  of  U.S.
Treasury,  James  A. Baker,  III,  before  the  Canadian
Importers  and  Exporters  Associations,  Toronto,  Canada,
June  22,  1988.)
The  latter  part  of the  statement  could  hardly  be a  more  explicit
endorsement  of discrimination,  including  conditional  MFN. One  wonders  whether
sufficient  consideration  has  been  given  to  the  effects  of tris  change  in
leadership  on the  trading  system  as  a whole,  and  whether  it is  indeed  possible
to preserve  or achieve  a multilateral  system  by  means  of  discriminatory
weapons. The  United  States  appears  to  be joining  much  of  Europe  and  the  Group
of 77  in turning  its  back  --  or at least  half  of it  --  on  non-discrimination.
GATT  Codes
Bilateral  trade  ag-eements  and  the  targetted  (and  often
discriminatory)  levering  open  of  markets  are relatively  new  United  States
trading  policies,  at least  on the  scale  and  with  the  explicit  advocacy  that17
has  been  apparent  recently. These  developments  were  perhaps  foreshadowed  by
the  GATT  Codes  and  more  particularly  by the  conditional  MFN  or "restricted
club"  interpretation  of some  of them,  and  of  the  Subsidies  Code  in
particular.  What  has  not  been  settled  legally,  though  probably  it  has  been  de
facto  despite  very  weak  legal  support,  is  whether  a Contracting  Party  to the
GATT,  having  itself  accepted  the  provisions  of  a GATT  Code,  is required  under
Article  I of the  GATT  to  extend  the  benefits  of the  Code  to all  members  of
GATT,  or  wLether  it  can  restrict  these  benefits  only  to  those  countries  that
have  also  accepted  the  provisions  of the  Code. The  United  States  has  adopted
a  conditional  MFN  interpretation  of three  of the  Codes:  Subsidies  and
Countervailing,  Government  Procurement,  and  Technical  Barriers  (or
Standards).  The  insistence  by the  United  States  on  applying  these  Codes  on
its  own  terms,  without  testing  under  GATT  procedures  the  compliance  of its
interpretation  with  Article  I  of the  CATT,  and  the  apparent  determination  of
the  United  States  and  other  governments  to pursue  further  agreements  in  a GATT
context on a conditional  HFN  basis,  provides  another  significant  threat  to  a
non-discriminatory  trading  system.
It can  be argued  that  the  United  States  and  other  countries  taking
this  conditional  MFN  approach  to  Codes  (including  possible  Codes  in the  area
of services)  are simply  extending  into  the  non  tariff  barrier  arena  the
bilateral  negotia'ions  and  attempts  to contain  free  riding  that  have  always
been  a part  of multilateral  trade  negotiations.  This  point  has some  substance
but  while  the  principals  in  the  successive  rounds  of  GATT  negotiations  have
attempted  to  contain  short-run  free  riding,  there  has  been  little  restriction
of free  riding  in  the  ionger  term:  access  to  benefits  already  negotiated  has18
been  relatively  easy  for  most  countries,  whether  they  were  new  members  of  GATT
or new  exporters  of the  relevant  products. This  is  not the  case  with the
three  Codes  mentioned  above;  conditionality  continues  with  no unconditional
multilateralization.  The  crux  of the  question  of  discrimination  here is  how
easy  it  is  to joir  the  club,  who  determines  the  rules  of entry,  and  who
interprets  them. Already,  considerable  ill-will  has  been  generated  on this
matter  by the  United  States  appearing  to  apply,  or attempt  to  apply,  different
standards  for  different  countries  --  Pakistan  and  India  in  particular.
Article  XIX
Pressure  to have  Article  XIX  qualified  or amended  so  as to  allow
selectivity  was  resisted  in  the  Tokyo  Round,  but  it  has  returned. Selectivity
is  a  key  point  in  the  whole  question  of discrimination  and,  arguably,  through
that  on secure  markets  access. While  time-binding  of safeguard  protection  is
offered  as compensation  for  selectivity,  the  almost  thirty  years  of
restriction  and  extension  of coverage  of  what  started  as a short  term  cotton
textiles  arrangement  issues  a warning  regarding  the  trading  of birds  in the
hand  for  (future)  birds  in  the  bush.
IV.  Conclusion
Nearly  all  the  action  on the  international  trade  negotiations  stage
thus  appears  to be in  discriminatory  and  conditional  MFN  forms,  including  the
action  on  GATT's  own  stage. Does  this  threaten  multilateralism,  and thereby19
threaten  market  access  for  small  traders? I fear  that  it  does  unless  (i)  any
"clubs"  of like  minded  countries  formed  to restrain  on  a reciprocal  basis
particular  non-tariff  measures  are  open  to  new  members  on the  same  terms  as
those  agreed  for  the  founder  members,  and  that  compliance  with these  terms  is
determined  corporately  by  existing  members  and  not  unilaterally  by any  one  of
them;  (ii)  any  markets  levered  open (such  as Korean  insurance  and  Japanese
beef  and  oranges)  be opened  in  as non-discriminatory  manner  as the  remaining
restrictions  will permit;  and  (iii)  preferential  trade  arrangements  shculd
fully  meet  the  requirements  of  GATT's  Article  XXIV  --  that  is  they  should  be
fully-fledged  customs  unions  or free  trade  areas  and  should  not  raise  barriers
against  other  countries.
These  conditions  may  appear  to  be somewhat  utopian,  and  are  certainly
not  in the  spirit  of the  main  trading  initiatives  of  many  of the  smvaller,  as
well  as the  larger,  trading  nations  of the  world. It is  the  smaller  traders
of the  world  that  will  continue  to  be discriminated  against  on  balance  by
discriminatory  trade,  so it  may  be time  for  them  to take  the  lead  against
it.  But  to do so they  would  have  to commit  themselves  to support  the  general
application  of trading  rules  and  to constrain  their  own  trading  policies  in  a
way that  many  have  been  loathe  to  do in the  past. One  can  listen  again  to
Keynes'  address  to the  House  of Lords  in 1945  in  relation  to  the  U.K. joining
the  post-war  international  economic  institutions  (Keynes,  1979,  pp.623-4):
They [the  policies)  aim,  above  all,  at the  restoration
of multilateral  trade.  ...  The  bias  of the  policies
before  you  is  against  bilateral  barter  and  every  kind  of
discriminatory  practice. The  separate  economic  blocs
and  all  the  friction  and  loss  of friendship  they  must20
bring  with them  are  expedients  to  which  one  may  be
driven  in  a  hostile  world,  where  trade  has  ceased  over
wide  areas  to be  co-operative  and  peaceful  and  where  are
forgotten  the  healthy  rules  of mutual  advantage  and
equal  treatment.  But  it is surely  crazy  to prefer  that.21
Endnotes
1.  A fuller  expression  of  many  of the  points  in  this  paper  is to  be found  in
Snape  (1986)  and  (1988).
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